Edinburgh Council’s Transport and Environment Committee will consider this report on the Trams to Newhaven project on Thursday 25 April.
To repeat a mantra, NTBCC and the other community councils in Community Councils Together on Trams believe that the project is not yet finished. The report itself notes that 69 ‘defects’ (i.e. items that are not to plan or specification) of 872 remain open.
Simply put, the report does not properly address the many concerns that NTBCC and CCTT have raised regarding the completion of the outstanding public realm work associated with the Trams Project nor provide any meaningful information about the resolution of the identified defects.
Hence CCTT is submitting the following written deputation, while New Town & Broughton Community Council will submit a verbal deputation, to TEC on Thursday.
Here is the PDF of CCTT’s deputation. (The text and images are also below the ‘read-more’ cut.)
CCTT deputation to Transport and Environment Committee 25 April 2024 (8.2 Edinburgh Tram York Place to Newhaven Project Delivery)
23/04/24
Introduction
CCTT is a coalition of the four Community Councils Together on Trams set up to engage with CEC and the tram project team before, during and after the construction works between York Place and Newhaven.CCTT members have engaged individually with the original tram project (that was curtailed at York Place), then as a coalition of CCs with the emerging Full Business Case since July 2018 and subsequently with members of the Trams to Newhaven (TTN) team. CCTT/TTN meetings soon became fairly regular (with minutes taken and published on CC websites) and became monthly during construction and continued until June 2023.
We want this tram project to succeed – as we said in our 2018 manifesto. This remains our main motivation.
We acknowledge that there can be tensions between the delivery of a live strategic project (TTN) and new future strategic goals (Tram 2). Both are worthwhile ambitions. But: which should be prioritised when there isn’t an abundance of financial resources and capacities to achieve both goals in parallel?
Preamble
Partially in response to Councillors’ motions last year, a project “close out” report was advertised in the January Rolling Actions Log.
At that point we wrote to the Project Team and Councillors, setting out a “checklist” of key questions (see appendix) that such a project close report would need to answer.
We note, it is no longer titled a “close out” report – presumably in recognition that many answers are not available yet and that a lot of important work remains to be done, thus vindicating our mantra: that the project is not finished.
“start of revenue service”: worn out lines,
previous repair attempts, against A-listed
building in the background; not the high-
quality environment we were promised
post hoc widened for cyclists following
international press coverage (is remaining
space for the planter really necessary?);
rocking slab is a hazard for pedestrians;
potholes near lip increase risks for cyclists
Our most pressing concerns
- It is not clear that all issues have been identified. Councillors and stakeholders still don’t know the scale of the task ahead.
- Who is the team tasked to identify and process the many and complex outstanding issues and to negotiate robustly with the contractor (and utilities and third parties) during the rapidly approaching end of the defect period? Is it adequately resourced? Why was it not formally established from the start of the defects period?
- Elapsed time to the resolution of each defect – be that lack of bus shelters, delayed buses and tram and congestion/pollution caused by a faulty/incomplete signalling system, broken pavestones, or a visibly decaying public realm – has real life costs and consequences for communities along the route.
Have the Final Business Case ambitions been met?
[from the 2018 FBC 1.18 and 1.23 – our emphasis]
The project supports the Council’s plans to:
- improve the pedestrian experience in the core city centre area and increase space for pedestrians
- […] offer dedicated cycle provision in the area; and
- reduce the detrimental impact of motor vehicles on the city centre environment.
Tram supports this outcome by providing accessible public transport, public realm improvements along the route, excellent walking and cycling provision between Picardy Place and Foot of the Walk, and improvements in local air quality through reduced emissions.
Four big risks
Safety: Road Safety Audit is not included or referenced in this report. This RSA is intended to identify whether there are any serious issues with the design and construction of the changes to the road layout. Without it, the roads authority, consultants and contractors are at risk of a charge of Corporate Manslaughter, should there be a serious or fatal incident. In addition, many of the known defects have the potential to cause accidents.
Financial: insufficient monies clawed back from contractor and extra CEC costs because too many defects have been resolved in favour of the contractor.
Hence the need for a well-resourced and clearly tasked team to undertake this work in a timely and contractually effective manner.
Political: there is serious dis-enchantment along the route (“we didn’t need a tram – the city did; they built a tram and left a mess”). Transparency on outstanding issues and a clear route to resolution will help to address this concern.
Strategic: a failure to address any of the three risks above will impact negatively on the North-South tram project and long-term viability of Line 1.
Hence the need for a well-resourced and clearly tasked team to undertake this work in a timely and contractually effective manner.
Political: there is serious dis-enchantment along the route (“we didn’t need a tram – the city did; they built a tram and left a mess”). Transparency on outstanding issues and a clear route to resolution will help to address this concern.
Strategic: a failure to address any of the three risks above will impact negatively on the North-South tram project and long-term viability of Line 1.
What we asked TTN in January and Councillors in February 2024
We posed 7 questions to be addressed and answered in this report. We note with regret (see appendix) that many remain unanswered or sufficient detail is still missing:
- the aforementioned missing Road Safety Audit
- sufficient details on defects (total number, sqm and costs)
- a complete list of design issues, their status (some have apparently been de-scoped) and path to resolution
- a narrative on signalling problems and a path to resolution beyond an opaque reference in appendix D)
- a commitment to a Lessons Learned session with CCTT (first mooted in November 2022)
- a sufficiently detailed and complete Handover Plan
- clarity on when the temporary – tram construction enabling – TTRO will be revoked and replaced by a permanent TRO
CCTT asks
- Just do what you said you would do in the Final Business Case (including an evaluation report to assess delivery of the projected benefits, in line with HM Treasury and Scottish Government guidance) and address the issues highlighted in our checklist commentary (see appendix)
- Deliver the Lessons Learned session with CCTT to look at:
- design processes and evolution
- impact from construction and diversions, and
- post construction reinstatement, defects resolution and design changes and fine-tuning
- Continue to engage with (and learn from) local communities along the route
Appendix: What we asked TTN and Councillors in January/February 2024 – key questions that the upcoming close-out report needs to answer
| CCTT Email to TTN and Councillors (24/1/24) | CCTT commentary on TEC Report 8.2 (19/4/24) |
| 1. Stage 31 Road Safety Audit: What is the status of this report? What are the key findings and resulting actions? When will it be published? | 1. RSA: There is no mention of the RSA3 in the report nor have any answers been provided about its location and timing. The RSA is a contractual requirement and must be finalised before the project close out can be completed. What about stage 42? |
| 2. Defects:a) outstanding defects: How many are there (in terms of database rows, but also quantified in terms of absolute numbers or sqm, and £££s)? Accompanied by a full list or relevant examples. | 2. Defects: a) The report does provide a list of outstanding defects including some that relate to utility works but there is no detail on the overall or individual cost and scope of these defects. |
| b) removed and accepted defects: How many have been removed or accepted (in terms of database rows, but also quantified in terms of absolute numbers or sqm, and £££s)?Accompanied by a full list or relevant examples with reasons for removal or acceptance. | b) Apart from providing a count of accepted/cancelled defects there is no other information (costs, sqm) provided in the report to understand what has been agreed. |
| c) independent quality assurance: How can we be sure that all defects are on the TTN register? Alternatively: can a complete list of all defects (outstanding, removed, accepted) be published? | c) The report does not contain an overall list of all of the defects, so it is not possible to know if those not shown on the outstanding list have ever been shown. Or for that matter, whether they have been accepted or resolved. Who monitors/audits these very important (re)classifications? The list of landscaping and public realm work that is either outstanding or has been descoped is not complete. We need to have a complete list of what is still outstanding or no longer part of project. The report does not provide any timing for the works shown to be completed. |
| d) outstanding utility works (e.g. damaged/collapsed manhole covers) along the TTN route: Are they on the defects register? If not, why were (are) they not handled by TTN? If not TTN, who monitors (and pays for) their resolution? | d) Apart from a few outstanding defects which are utility-related, it is not clear how many such defects exist and who is responsible for their resolution. Damaged (or about to fail) utility covers on roadway and pavement are a serious issue (see 2020 documentationfor Princes Street); according to an FOI “These were raised with utility providers and agreed that each utility provider would rectify the defects.” Does this mean SFN pays for the works? What is exact recovery mechanism? Who is pursuing the utility companies to undertake repairs |
| e) defects on TTN diversion routes: Have the diversion routes been inspected in accordance with the Code of Construction Practice (section 5.5) and if so what remedial work has been identified? Is there a list of the identified repairs? How will these issues be monitored? Who will be responsible for the cost of any required repairs? | e) There is no mention in the report of any defects to the diversion routes or the required remedial action. Clarification is needed about the responsibility of the parties for the repair of damage to the diversion routes even though this was included in the agreed Code of Construction Practice. |
| 3. Design Issues: What are the design issues recognised by TTN? What aspects have been de-scoped? | 3. Design Issues: The report only mentions a small number of design issues which it states will be handled separately. It is also stated that the design complies with Edinburgh Street Design Guidance but as has been noted elsewhere this guidance has been updated so that it is no longer correct that the design complies with current guidance. |
| CCTT Email to TTN and Councillors (24/1/24) | CCTT commentary on TEC Report 8.2 (19/4/24) |
| 4. Signalling Problems: Are these on the defects register? Who monitors (and pays for) their resolution? Have the delays caused by signalling problems been quantified? | 4. Signalling Problems: The only reference to signalling problems is in the Ready to Operate lesson learned. It would appear that there are continuing problems which can only be resolved once the CEC completes its upgrades to the overall signalling system. Greater clarity is required on the extent of problems and the scope/timing of any resolution. Without an efficient signalling system, the project is not finished and 10 months into revenue service, the benefits of a fully optimised system have not yet been achieved. It is a key component of the tram’s success and speedy progress towards resolution needs to be a priority. We note that reference is made (Appendix D, item 2), to the problems coordinating the project work with the overall signalling upgrades required due to contractual/communication issues. How are defects/outstanding issues that are not the responsibility of the Trams contractor being managed? |
| 5. Lessons Learned: We note that the close out report will include the outcome of the lessons learned activities. When is it proposed to have the postponed CCTT lessons learned session? What lessons learned sessions on other aspects have been conducted to date? | 5. Lessons Learned: There are some useful observations contained in the summaries of the lessons learned undertaken to date. The report does not mention the planned lessons learned exercise with the Community Councils despite this being promised for over a year. We believe that there should be a commitment to undertake this and any other outstanding lesson learned exercises. |
| 6. Handover Documentation: What is the status of the “handover documentation”? | 6. Handover Documentation: The report includes a detailed handover plan but it is not clear from the document what has been completed, what is underway and what is outstanding. Why has the Handover Plan only now been prepared given that the handover has been ongoing for over a year? Given that the Plan will require the Council to absorb the future cost of the operation and maintenance of the new assets, one would expect the Council to formally approve this Plan. |
| 7. Temporary TRO: When will TRO (TEMP/19/210) be revoked? What actions are required to allow this to be revoked?” | 7. Temporary TRO: The report makes no mention of the need for a new TRO or the revocation of the TTRO introduced to allow the Trams to Newhaven project to proceed. This need to be clarified to allow proper controls of traffic and parking to be in place. |
1 Stage 3 Road Safety Audits should be undertaken when the highway scheme construction is complete and preferably before the works are opened to road users.
2 The Stage 4 is carried out using 12 months of validated, post highway scheme opening, road traffic collision data.
3 Although not seen as a legal document, in the event of a serious or fatal incident on a scheme, the road safety audit process may be examined and the report [and] agreed response with actual action taken may be used in evidence. In the worst-case scenario this could lead to a charge of Corporate Manslaughter/Homicide on roads authority, consultants and contractor. [sweco.co.uk]
lhncc.org.uk 
Good piece. I’ve made similar comment in other forums. I feel that the tram project, despite having completed the ‘core delivery’ of a functioning (and successful) tram line, have left the public realm of Leith Walk in a state of disrepair. Loose/broken slabs and edgings everywhere. Whatever happened to the plants for the planters? Some road signs are misleading or ambiguous. Disregard for road signs (one way, no-U) is widespread, and understandable. I use the cycle lanes – they’re not quite as bad as some press makes out, but they are pretty awful. Traffic light intervals are weird. The NB cycle lane at the Foot of the Walk stops with decaying bollards and a non-operative crossing. I could go on, and on, and on.